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Deregulation of higher education: Tuition fee differentiation and selectivity in the US
1  By deregulation we have in mind the relaxation of existing regulations in the public sector, permitting higher
education institutions to determine their own tuition price, to adopt their own admission policy, to design their
own curriculum, to develop their own human resource management, and so forth. To put it differently, this form of
deregulation devolves control over decisions to the individual institutions. It should be noted that the terminology
is also used to refer to privatisation, e.g. de-monopolisation, de-nationalisation, and “contracting out” (cf. Dill,
1997). But these other forms of deregulation will not be discussed here.
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4.1 Background
This chapter deals with the issue of deregulation in the higher education sector. To what extent
should higher education institutions be free to determine their own policies? Or should the
government decide on important issues?1 We study this question in detail by focussing on two
major and interrelated issues (giving an indication of the extent of deregulation), namely the
determination of tuition fees and selection of students. Our research questions are:
• What are the main effects of deregulating tuition fee policies?
• What are the main effects of deregulating admission policies?
• How do these policies interact?
Discussions on deregulation often meet with resistance. Opponents argue that deregulation
promotes inequality and endangers access. And differentiation in the higher education sector
could come at the cost of transparency, so it is argued. On the other hand, there is an increased
need for diversity to improve the match between demand and supply. And deregulation will
foster competition between suppliers, leading to a better price-quality ratio.
In the US the higher education sector is strongly diversified with completely regulated public
schools on one end of the spectrum and fully free private universities on the other end. These
differences within the American higher education sector provide an excellent case-study for
evaluating the effects of deregulation.
We start in Section 4.2 with a brief discussion of relevant theory on deregulation in general,
and on student selection and tuition fee differentiation in particular. Section 4.3 provides some
insight into the present situation with respect to admission and tuition fee policies in Australia,
Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US. In Section 4.4 we study tuition fee and
admission policies in the US, and present some empirical findings on the connection between
tuition fees and academic quality, and between quality and student selection. In Section 4.5 we
evaluate the pros and cons of a deregulated higher education system in the US in terms of the
effects on educational quality and accessibility.
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2  In most countries tuition fees only cover a fraction of the average direct cost of a higher education program (in
the Netherlands about 20%, see Chapter 1).
3  It should be noted that estimated price elasticities may become unreliable for large price changes so that
enrollment changes could be larger than predicted from the estimates when cost-covering tuition fees are charged.
4  Also the Minister of Education, Mr. Hermans, recognises the importance to provide “Harvard-, Yale- and
Princeton-like” training programs (cf. de Volkskrant, 14 November 2000).
5  There is a growing literature on the effects of competition on (higher) education. An interesting example is Epple
and Romano (1998), who demonstrate that competition promotes quality-differentiation. A recent empirical
investigation of these effects is available in Epple, Figlio, and Romano (2000).
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4.2 Deregulation and economic theory
4.2.1 Tuition fee deregulation
In many countries tuition fees, i.e. the prices of higher education charged to students, are
controlled by the government.2 By keeping tuition fees low, the government tries to promote
access to higher education. This is the basic argument behind regulated tuition fees. However,
the available empirical evidence suggests that the price elasticity of the demand for higher
education is low (see Chapter 3). When students’ responsiveness to price reductions is weak, the
expansion in demand due to regulated tuition fees is limited. In that case, a price cap is a costly
instrument to promote accessibility as it merely implies a shift in educational spending from
price-insensitive students to the average taxpayer.3
In addition, in light of recent trends and developments it seems inevitable to move towards a
more differentiated higher education system when there is consensus that a country needs to
have some excellent universities “in-house”.4 For instance, globalization will extend the higher
education market beyond national borders. Students and staff become more and more mobile
internationally, and educated people will more often work abroad. Also new technological
opportunities such as the advent of the Internet and ICT-developments will have their impact on
the higher education market, for instance by facilitating distance learning and the “virtual
university”. So to prevent the best students and staff from switching to a foreign university, the
higher education sector has to offer an attractive alternative. To facilitate quality-differentiation,
it could be helpful to allow the higher education institutions to set their own tuition prices.
What will happen when institutions are permitted to set tuition fees themselves? Tuition fees
would then more closely reflect actual costs and market conditions. This will promote
competition in the higher education sector. Schools try to differentiate themselves by looking for
niches in the market, i.e. particular price-quality combinations (cf. Hoxby, 1997). The match
between demand and supply will improve, as institutions become more responsive to students’
need and social demand. Competition for students will be fostered (through tuition discounting,
for instance), and institutions try to recruit students who fit best with the study program.5
Two remarks are in order. First, one may argue that the objective function of higher
education institutions is different from those of firms operating in other markets. Whereas
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6  Two examples show that a substantial fraction of students comes from all over the country if institutions
differentiate themselves. University Maastricht attracts lots of students from other regions because of its specific
didactic system, and Wageningen University provides unique programs in the field of agriculture.
7  A related interesting issue is whether ICT developments and distance-learning are going to reduce the
importance of location. In the limit, spatial factors turn irrelevant (“the death of distance”) so that the market for
higher education becomes a global one. As a consequence, price-quality ratios will improve because competition
for students becomes more intense.
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commercial firms mostly pursue maximisation of profit or shareholders’ value, higher education
institutions may strive for excellence, or academic reputation. It is therefore unlikely that the
pricing policy of the higher education institutions is based on pure profit-maximisation. In
addition, because of the customer-input technology in educational production, an institution
must take account of the effects of its pricing policy on the student population. Second, the
asserted consequences of tuition fee deregulation will only materialise when competition in the
higher education market is not hindered. This is our next topic.
4.2.2 Impediments to competition
An opponent could argue that the alleged competition between schools when fee differentiation
is permitted will fail to occur. Indeed, a number of factors could impede the competitive process,
namely:
• Limited student mobility;
• Information problems;
• Indivisibilities;
• Economies of scale.
First, students often choose to go to a higher education institute in their neighbourhood.
Especially the vocational colleges often mainly serve a regional market. And even in a small
country like the Netherlands students often choose a university in their region. It remains the
question whether this is so because students are home-loving or because they think that higher
education institutions do not differ so much. However, travelling costs are limited, and the
observation that Dutch students are prepared to move when institutions differentiate
themselves6 supports the claim that student mobility is low because differentiation is limited.
This low mobility could be problematic, as it turns the higher education institutions into local
monopolies. In a fix-price system, this could lead to a reduction in educational quality – for
instance when the academic staff wants to have an easy life. In a flex-price model it could lead to
lower quality and / or higher tuition fees. So in both systems student immobility could worsen
the price-quality ratio. And since quality decreases are more difficult to observe than tuition fee
increases, there is a real danger of falling educational standards in an environment with limited
student mobility.7 Hoxby (1997) studies the historical development of competition in the US
higher education market in light of this problem of limited student mobility. The large distances
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
8  An interesting observation in markets with experience goods is that entry of new firms in the market may actually
induce incumbents to increase their price. The intuition is that the new firms attract the price sensitive customers
while the incumbents keep the price insensitive ones. This segmentation of the market enables the established
firms to raise their price as they keep the loyal customers. An example of this effect can be found in the market for
pharmaceuticals (cf. Frank and Salkever, 1991).
9  The intended introduction of a two-cycle Bachelor-Master system in the higher education sector in the wake of
the Bologna-declaration will help to intensify competition for more advanced students in the Netherlands.
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and limited transport facilities severely hampered students’ freedom of movement for a long
time. Technological developments in the transport- and telecommunication-sector (resulting in
a reduction of travelling-expenses and telephone-tariffs) helped to foster student mobility, and
thereby competition in the higher education sector. In our reading, the analysis in Hoxby
predicts that competition in the higher education system is going to intensify in the near future,
in light of the above-mentioned trends of globalization and the advent of the Internet.
Second, information problems hamper the competition process in a free market. For
instance, students and prospective students often have limited information on the quality of the
various education programs. When educational quality is difficult to observe, higher education
institutes could exploit their information advantage at their own benefit. This will result in
similar problems as mentioned above: lower quality in a fix-price setting; lower quality and / or
higher price in a flex-price setting. Leslie and Johnson (1974) stress the importance of these
information problems in their sceptical review on competition in the higher education industry.
Another information problem is that one cannot completely know the value of an education
program in advance. Education is to some extent an experience good. This implies that
established incumbent schools have an advantage in the market. As a consequence, reputation
effects could erect entry barriers for (potential) newcomers and thereby frustrate the competitive
process.8 Again, the incumbent institutions might be tempted to raise the price-quality ratio.
Third, higher education programs are to a large extent indivisible. A college entry decision is
in fact a yes or no decision. It is not a serious option to attend two years of a three year program
and then go to the labour market. And it is often difficult to attend part of a program at one
college and the remainder at another. This implies that students are “locked-in” at their higher
education institution. So once enrolled, student mobility is sharply reduced. To put it differently,
competition for more advanced students in the higher education market is almost entirely ruled
out. This could lead to a deterioration of the price-quality ratio, and a mismatch between student
demand and the institution’s specialisation pattern.9
Finally, educational production is sometimes characterised by economies of scale. Natural
sciences, engineering and medical studies require expensive equipment and laboratories. Such
investments can only be made when the institute is large enough. This implies that large
schools have a cost advantage over small ones, and that there are substantial entry barriers for
newcomers in the market for such costly study programs. In case of such a “natural” monopoly,
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the government could impose price regulations to prevent the abuse of market power. To put it
differently, differences in the cost structure across subject areas could give rise to differences in
the extent of price regulation.
4.2.3 Student selection
For some commodities, customers may have a double role in that they are involved in both the
production and the consumption process (cf. Chapter 2). Think of a trendy bar. Most people do
not go to such a bar because they are thirsty, but because they want to meet and talk to others. In
fact, social interaction is probably the bar’s main product. And value-added is determined by the
number and type of visitors. In case of queueing, the porters often give priority to those
customers whose presence will be appreciated by the other guests (beautiful girls do not have to
wait in the cold and do not have to pay an entrance fee). By doing so, the porters correct for the
external effects associated with the appearance of these popular visitors.
This may seem a peculiar example, but comparable principles are at work in the higher
education sector. We can characterise the educational process by a customer-input technology in
the sense that students are both consumers and producers of education. Social contacts among
students and communication between students and staff are important ingredients of the
educational process. This implies that the quality of a training program partly depends on the
quality of the students (cf. Rothschild and White, 1995).
The notion of a customer-input technology has one major implication: it provides a
justification for selection of students. Universities can reach a higher quality-level by selecting
the best mix of students. It thereby also gives a rationale for price discrimination among
students, such as merit-based student aid. According to this principle, the best students should
pay lower net tuition fees in order to correct for the positive spillovers they generate. These
customer-input arguments are not purely academic: both selection of students and merit-based
aid are actually used in the US as well as in some other countries, and the notion of customer-
input technology is often mentioned in this context.
4.2.4 Problems with student selection
Two problems may arise with selection of students:
• Errors in the selection process;
• Matching versus mixing of students.
First, selecting students inevitably involves making mistakes. Sorting out good students is
difficult, and there is always the possibility that suitable students fail the admission test and
unsuitable students pass the test. (By “suitable” we mean students who would have completed
their studies if they were enrolled and by “unsuitable” students we mean students who do not
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
10  We define a type I error as the rejection of a student who should have been admitted, and a type II error as the
admittance of a student who should have been rejected.
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complete and drop-out.) We refer to these errors as type I and type II errors.10 While these errors
in the selection procedure are problematic, it should be realised that open admission also leads
to mistakes as some fraction of the student body will drop out. So open admission involves type
II errors. An ultimate assessment of the problems with student selection should therefore be
based on a comparison with the mistakes connected with open admission. We are not aware of
examples of such type of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the literature; a first attempt of a CBA to
explore the desirability of student selection in the Dutch context is presented in Canton (2001b).
Though student selection can also be organised in a centralised system, the higher education
institutions probably have more information on observed student characteristics than the
government, so that delegation of the selection process to the individual institutions would
result in a better allocation of talent.
Second, there is a debate on matching versus mixing of students. Briefly put, student
selection is aimed at matching students while open admission leads to mixed classes. Whereas
the notion of customer-input technology argues for matching, other stories would favour a
mixing-strategy. For example, mixed classes could be the optimal strategy (from a social point of
view at least) when personal talent is not some fixed exogenous endowment but something that
could develop in an appropriate environment through social interaction with good students. In
that case, matching students according to entrance criteria could imply some loss in human
potential. On the other hand, effective education time in the classroom is reduced when bad
students ask more of a teacher’s time. As a consequence, some mixture of “good” and “bad”
students would be the optimal strategy. This is the point made in Lazear (1999).
A final comment is in order. While higher education institutions take account of the
consequences of errors in the selection process and internalise spillovers connected with the
process of educational production, the benefits from human capital spillovers to society at large
might be undervalued. This could imply that the institutions calculate a positive net gain from
selective admission, whereas a social CBA would turn out to be negative.
4.2.5 Relationship between tuition fee and admission policies
Decisions about the extent of government influence on the determination of tuition fees impact
on optimal admission strategies and vice versa. When tuition fees are centrally determined and
uniform across subject areas, student selection may only be partially successful as a vehicle for
differentiation. Schools with international ambitions are limited in their freedom to attract
additional financial resources as they are unable to charge higher tuition fees, so that they may
experience difficulties in recruiting superstars. And by superstars we not only refer to academic
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staff, but also to students. We have seen that the observation of a customer-input technology in
educational production calls for a policy of price discrimination between students. In particular,
universities may want to give discounts to students who raise the quality-level of an education
program. And when universities are limited in their possibilities to do so, they may be unable to
attract the best students. Likewise, higher education institutes who basically serve a local market
and who probably have a less expensive production process cannot attract additional students by
lowering tuition fees in a regulated environment. So also for this type of school the fixed price
policy may have adverse effects on the institution’s admission strategy.
4.3 Deregulation in international perspective
In order to illustrate the substantial international differences, let us briefly sketch the actual
situation with respect to tuition fee policies and selection procedures in Australia, Denmark, the
Netherlands, the UK and the US.
Table 4.1 presents a summary. In Australia, tuition fees are centrally determined but vary across
subject areas since 1997 (see Chapter 3). In deciding about the tariff group in which a discipline
is classified, the government both looks at the costs of the training program and at the
(expected) future earnings for the students in that program. The total number of publicly funded
study places is centrally determined by the government. As there are more applications than
study places, students are selected on the basis of their results at secondary school. About 5% of
the applicants was rejected in 1998. As of 1998, rejected students can buy a study place at a cost-
covering tuition price. Universities are permitted to levy cost-covering fees for up to 25% of the
Australian students they admit, under the condition that their quota of HECS-supported
students are filled. In addition, universities are statutorily required to charge cost-covering fees
to international students. So in the Australian system there is differentiation by subject area,
between home and foreign students and between home students who are eligible for HECS-
funded places and home students who are admitted on a cost-covering basis (cf. Greenaway and
Haynes, 2000).
Table 4.1 Tuition fee policies and selection procedures: international comparison
Tuition fees Selection of students
Australia differentiated, centralised yes
Denmark zero yes
the Netherlands uniform tariff limited
United Kingdom uniform tariff yes
United States differentiated, decentralised* yes*
* Some public schools (community colleges) do not charge tuition fees and have an open admission policy.
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
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In Denmark, no tuition fees are charged. Danish higher education institutions are, however,
permitted to select their students. So admission policies are deregulated. As we will see in
Chapter 5, some institutions adopt a rather selective admission regime while others accept all
applicants. Information on quality-differences across universities is not readily available to
students and their parents. This reduces transparency on the higher education market. In
addition, student mobility is limited (students do not have obvious reasons to prefer one
university over another so that they just might go to the nearest university), and competition for
students is hampered.
In the Netherlands, tuition fees for regular full-time students are centrally determined by the
government. But universities can freely determine tuition fees for full-time students not eligible
for student support, part-time students, and external candidates. The institutions do make use of
this discretionary freedom (see Chapter 1). Also admission criteria are centrally determined for
most subject areas in the Netherlands. Only students applying for a slot at an art academy or
Ph.D.-program have to go through a selection procedure. In addition, some studies like
medicine or dentistry have restricted admission, based on a weighted lottery where the chance
depends on average grade points at secondary school.
In the United Kingdom tuition fees are uniform, and centrally determined by the government
for regular full-time EU undergraduate students. However, universities are free to set their own
prices for part-time students and for non-EU overseas students. Universities have the freedom to
set their own selection criteria. These criteria can even differ across various disciplines within
the same university, and selection is in general rather rigorous. It is interesting to look at the
relationship between student selectivity and quality of the university. The Times presents a
ranking of 96 universities. Data are collected on teaching assessments, research, entry
standards, staff-student ratios, and library and computer spending. This data-set can be used to
study the relationship between selectivity and ranking. The top-5 of the UK is (1) Cambridge, (2)
Oxford, (3) Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine, (4) London School of
Economics and Political Science, and (5) University College London. Figure 4.1 shows the
relationship between selectivity and rank. The figure clearly shows that the best universities
adopt the most restrictive admission policies.
The United States have the most liberal higher education system in terms of tuition fee
deregulation and admission policies. The next section describes the US-system in more detail.
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11  Notice that by focussing on research universities, other parts of the US higher education system (like colleges
and non-research universities) are not included in the analysis.
12  On the Internet at caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar.www.
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Figure 4.1  Relationship between selectivity and quality for some British universities
Source: The Good University Guide, www.the-times.co.uk/news/pages/tim/98/05/15/timguggug01001.html?999.
4.4 Tuition fee and admission policies in the US
4.4.1 Tuition fee policies
In the US, not only private schools can set their own tuition fees, but also public schools often
have some freedom in their pricing policies (except the two-year community colleges who are
not allowed to charge any fees). This decentralised character of tuition price policies is rather
exceptional. We will explore levels and variety of prices charged to students, and we shall try to
detect determinants of tuition fees. In particular, we look at educational quality as a potential
explanation for tuition fee differentiation between higher education institutions. To that end, we
collected data on research universities11 available from the National Science Foundation.12
Because of missing data, two universities are left out (Rutgers the State University of NJ New
Brunswick and University of California-Irvine). We thus have data on 102 universities, from
which 62 are public and 40 private. We selected a number of variables to get a global picture on
the differences between public and private institutes.
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
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Table 4.2 summarises the data (mean values are above standard deviations). The table shows
that:
• Public universities receive 18% of their income from tuition fees, while this is 29% for private
institutes. With 74% of its revenues from tuition fees, Northeastern University is on top;
• Endowment income is negligible for the group of public universities, but amounts to 7% for
private universities. The “wealthiest” institute is Rice University, with 40% of its revenues
coming from endowments;
• The fraction of tenured academic staff is 63% for private and 69% for public universities;
• Annual salaries for academic personnel are on average about $10,000 higher at private
universities, but also vary stronger in the private sector (the standard deviation of salary
payments is almost twice as high for private universities compared to public universities). The
real money-makers are to be found at California Institute of Technology, earning an annual
salary of $112,000 (on average);
Table 4.2 Some facts of public and private universities in the US
Public universities Private universities Total
Revenues from tuition fees (% of total revenues)              18             29            22
              (8)           (16)           (13)
Endowment income (% of total revenues)               1              7              3
             (1)             (8)             (6)
Tenured staff (%)              69             63             67
             (7)           (13)           (10)
Salaries ($) 58,629 68,856 62,639
(6,257) (11,247) (9,916)
Quality academic personnel (1.24-4.70)              2.88              3.36               3.07
            (0.67)             (0.77)             (0.75)
Tuition fees ($) undergraduate / in-state 3,359 18,082 9,133
(1,085) (5,645) (8,055)
undergraduate / out-of-state 9,510 18,114 12,884
(2,521) (5,561) (5,800)
graduate / in-state 3,896 16,914 9,001
(1,491) (5,724) (7,389)
graduate / out-of-state 9,587 16,951 12,475
(2,665) (5,637) (5,450)
Note: Revenues from tuition fees are listed as a fraction of total revenues (adjusted total current funds revenues, excluding Pell grants (Pell
grants are grants for students provided by the government)). Endowment income is expressed as a fraction of total revenues. Average numbers
are reported above standard deviations. The sample includes 62 public and 40 private universities. Data on quality academic personnel apply to
1993, the other data to 1996.
Source: NSF, data available from Webcaspar (caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar).
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13  The top-10 in terms of quality of academic staff is: (1) Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (2) University of
California-Berkeley, (3) Harvard University, (4) California Institute of Technology, (5) Stanford University, (6)
University of Chicago, (7) Princeton University, (8) Yale University, (9) Cornell University and (10) Columbia
University in the City of New York.
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• With an average score of 3.36, private universities employ slightly better personnel than public
universities (the quality-indicator ranges from 1.24 to 4.70). Only one public university is listed
in the top-10, namely University of California-Berkeley.13
With regard to tuition fees, four categories of students are distinguished: undergraduate versus
graduate students and in-state versus out-of-state students. The table shows that:
• On average, tuition fees are substantially higher at private universities;
• The program level (undergraduate versus graduate) is not an important determinant of tuition
fees;
• Public universities strongly differentiate between in-state and out-of-state students (since a
substantial part of the university budget is paid out of state tax money).
With regard to measurement of quality, two additional comments are in order. First, quality not
only refers to academic quality, but may also relate to “fit for purpose”. While this dimension is
ignored in the U.S. News quality-indicator, some schools publish job market prospects of their
graduates (e.g. starting salaries). Good job market prospects are an indication that the training
program fits market demand. Second, some competition between institutions who measure
quality or a system of multiple accreditation could improve the quality-ranking methodology.
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
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To determine the relationship between quality (see the Box for an explanation of the ranking
methodology) and tuition fees, we carry out some regressions. Table 4.3 reports on regression
analysis on undergraduate tuition fees. In model (1) and (2) the dependent variable is tuition fees
for in-state students, while in (3) and (4) we look at tuition fees for out-of-state students.
Comparison of model (1) and (2) shows that tuition fees charged to in-state students are higher
and increase faster with quality at private institutions. But also the better public universities
charge higher tuition fees to their students. From (3) and (4) it can be seen that public
universities still charge lower fees to out-of-state students compared with the private institutions,
but the coefficient on quality is now in the same order of magnitude for both types of
How to measure quality?
In this Box we describe how the U.S. News quality-indicator is calculated (following Graham and Morse, 1999). The
quality-indicator is a weighted sum of the following seven categories (a recent discussion of these weights is
presented in Webster (2001)):
• Academic reputation. To quantify a school’s reputation, the presidents, provosts, and deans of admission are
asked to rate peer schools’ academic programs on a scale from 1 (marginal) to 5 (distinguished).
• Retention of students. 80 percent of the retention score is determined by the six-year graduation rate and 20
percent is determined by its freshman retention rate.
• Faculty resources. Five factors are used to assess a school’s commitment to superb instruction:
- class size, the proportion of classes with fewer than 20 students and of classes with more than 50 students
(40%);
- faculty salary (35%);
- the proportion of professors with the highest degree in their field (15%);
- the student-faculty ratio (5%);
- the proportion of full-time faculty (5%).
• Student selectivity. Four factors are used to quantify student selectivity:
- test scores of enrollees on the SAT- or ACT-test* (40%);
- the proportion of enrolled freshmen who graduated in the top 10 percent of their high school classes for the
national institutions and the top 25 percent for the regional schools (35%);
- the ratio of students admitted to applicants (15%);
- the ratio of students who enroll to those admitted (10%).
• Financial resources. This is measured by average spending per student on instruction, research, and education-
related services.
• Alumni giving. The percentage of alumni who gave to their school is taken as an indicator of alumni satisfaction.
• Graduation rate performance. For year x, this is the difference between a school’s six-year graduation rate for
the class that entered in year x-6 and the predicted rate for the class (after controlling for spending and student
aptitude). The idea here is that the college is enhancing achievement if the actual graduation rate is higher than
the predicted rate.
* For more information on these admission tests, visit www.sat.org and www.act.org.
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institutions: an increase of one standard deviation of educational quality is associated with a
$1,685 tuition fee increase (0.68  2.478  1000) at public universities and $1,949 at private
universities (0.78  2.499  1000).
Table 4.4 presents results from an analysis along the same lines for graduate students. A
similar picture emerges here, though private institutions seem to react to quality-increases even
stronger than in case of undergraduate training.
It is important to note that net tuition prices could be substantially lower than gross tuition fees
due to “tuition discounting”: colleges and universities have embraced the strategic use of aid to
students, and aid is shifting from need-based to merit-based. More and more institutions pursue
aggressive admission strategies to recruit the students they want to have. Many institutions have
paid a steep price in terms of sharply reduced net tuition revenues, leaving them with less
money for instruction. Such cut-throat competition could adversely affect the higher education
system.
Table 4.3 Determinants of undergraduate tuition fees in the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In-state / Public In-state / Private Out-of-state /
Public
Out-of-state /
Private
Constant 1.377 9.479 2.384 9.716
[0.556] [3.868] [1.074] [3.815]
Quality 0.689 2.560 2.478 2.499
[0.188] [1.122] [0.364] [1.107]
R2 0.18 0.12 0.44 0.12
Note: Standard-errors are between brackets.
Source: See Table 4.2.
Table 4.4 Determinants of graduate tuition fees in the US
(5) (6) (7) (8)
In-state / Public In-state / Private Out-of-state /
Public
Out-of-state /
Private
Constant 1.339 5.500 2.267 5.779
[0.775] [3.726] [1.159] [3.675]
Quality 0.889 3.396 2.546 3.324
[0.262] [1.081] [0.393] [1.066]
R2 0.16 0.21 0.41 0.20
Note: Standard-errors are between brackets.
Source: See Table 4.2.
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Two final comments about quality-stratification are in order. First, a disadvantage of the
ordinal quality-ranking methodology is that it provides no insight into absolute quality-levels and
absolute quality-differences between institutions. And some people claim that quality-
stratification has led to polarisation in the US higher education system. While we recognise the
possibility that good universities get better at the cost of the medium- and lower-ranked
institutions, this view is not supported by the facts (cf. Duffy and Goldberg, 1998). Second, and
finally, it is sometimes claimed that quality-differentiation in education could sustain income
differentials across communities. In several states of the US, primary and secondary public
schools are largely paid from local property taxes. As a result, there is a large disparity of
educational spending per student across districts. Inequity in educational opportunities at
primary and secondary public schools could be an important factor behind social polarisation.
The interested reader is referred to Bénabou (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), and
Durlauf (1996). However, it is far less likely that quality-differentiation within higher education
helps to sustain socioeconomic segregation: students can freely choose across schools,
institutions often have need-based student aid programs, and there are substantial returns to
higher education (probably also for graduates from lower-ranked institutions).
4.4.2 Admission policies
Let us now turn to the question of student selectivity. Again, a distinction should be made
between public and private universities. Private universities can always adopt their own
admission criteria, but in case of public institutions the responsible government (state or local
government) may control the school’s admission strategy (at least to some extent). This role of
government differs widely across states: from hardly any to fairly detailed regulation. For the
admission to a Bachelor’s program universities mostly look at high school scores. In about 20
out of the 50 states a compulsory high school exam guarantees a certain standardisation to make
high school scores comparable. In some cases the university takes an additional admission test,
e.g. the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). Selectivity is very strong at the top: prestigious
institutions select the best students from a large pool of applicants (from all over the world). At
the bottom end there is no selection at all: community colleges accept all applicants.
This widely diversified character of the American higher education system provides a good
example to study the relationship between university ranking and selectivity. In Figure 4.2 we
plot selectivity against quality-ranking (cf. the Box) for 21 higher education institutes. The figure
clearly shows a relationship between selectivity and ranking. Down-left are the best and most
selective schools (among them California Institute of Technology and Stanford University). We
hasten to add that the relationship in this figure does not reveal any direction of causality: we
cannot claim that a better ranking enables universities to be more selective or that more selective
universities climb up in rank. Probably both effects play a role.
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Figure 4.2  Relationship between selectivity and quality for some American universities
Source: Webcaspar (caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar) and U.S. News (www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/corank.htm).
So the above “eyeball econometrics” approach points at a relationship between educational
quality and admission policy. A recent – and more elaborate – study on this connection is
provided in Monks and Ehrenberg (1999). They investigate how college rankings influence
selection-policy for a number of private universities in the US, finding that a lower ranking:
• Induces universities to accept a larger proportion of the applicants (a one unit drop in ranking
leads to a 0.4%-point increase of the acceptance-rate);
• Leads to a reduction in the fraction of accepted students that register for the program (a one unit
drop in ranking leads to a 0.17%-point decrease of the fraction of accepted students that
registers);
• Decreases the average scholastic aptitude of student inflow (a one unit drop in ranking reduces
the average SAT-score by 2.8 points – with an average SAT-score of college students of 1001 in
1991 (cf. Hoxby, 1997)).
Another important issue is whether selection helps to improve completion rates. An interesting
study dealing with this issue is Light and Strayer (2000). They investigate whether the match
between student ability and college quality affects college graduation rates in the US. A number
of interesting findings emerge from their analysis. First, students at the bottom end of the
observed ability distribution hurt their graduation chances by attending high-quality schools.
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Second, the chance of completion first rises with college quality and then falls. So low-quality
colleges provide the best chance of graduation for low-ability students, but this is not the case for
students with measured ability in the top three quartiles. By-and-large, Light and Strayer
conclude that the match between student ability and college quality has a significant effect on
college completion.
4.5 Evaluation
In this chapter we looked at the issue of deregulation in higher education by discussing tuition
fee and admission policies in a number of countries. By-and-large, government regulation in the
higher education sector is still rather strong. In many countries tuition price is centrally
determined (like in Australia, the Netherlands and the UK) or zero (Denmark and the other
Scandinavian countries). Also admission policies vary substantially. Some countries employ
national admission criteria (the Netherlands), others permit the institutions a large autonomy
(UK).
The US higher education sector is a good example of a flexible system with regard to tuition
price and admission policies. This has led to substantial price- and quality-differentials across
higher education institutions. Universities focus on a particular segment of the market, and
compete for students within this segment. Economic theory predicts that this would lead to
improvements in the average quality and in price-quality ratios, and this claim seems to be
supported by the data (cf. the empirical analysis in Hoxby, 1997).
We also saw that flexibility may come at a price. Evidence from the US showed that the
better universities charge higher tuition fees. This may hamper accessibility for economically
disadvantaged students. On the other hand, to maintain or improve their academic reputation,
high-quality universities are forced to attract good students (independent of their socio-economic
background). For that reason, US universities sometimes employ a high tuition – high aid
strategy. Students pay a high price, but poorer students receive financial support that (at least)
partly compensates for these higher costs. Put differently, rich students cross-subsidise poor
students. If universities do not adopt such a high tuition – high aid policy, they may not be able
to maintain their academic quality.
In addition, deregulation will only deliver the desired effects on price-quality ratios when the
higher education market is competitive and transparent. Students and their parents must have
access to reliable information on study programs, quality, tuition fees and future income
prospects to make the correct choices. Such information systems are available in the US and the
UK, but may need some further development in the Netherlands and Denmark.
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As we have seen, tuition policies and admission policies are interrelated. These issues cannot be
studied independently. From the international comparison provided in this chapter, we consider
three possible combinations:14
• Regulated tuition fees and admission policies
This system has a tendency to focus on the common denominator. The use of average
admission criteria implies that the average quality of the student population will be comparable
across higher education institutions. Since tuition fees are centrally determined, also the price
mechanism cannot help to serve as an allocation device. Proponents of this system argue that it
is equitable, since the regulated system would secure broad accessibility to higher education.
Also, in combination with peer review of educational quality the system may provide a high
average quality of higher education. Opponents criticise such a system for its homogenising
character. The system frustrates the competition process, as universities cannot compete on
price and can only partly compete on quality. The latter outcome is due to the fact that
admission criteria are uniform, so that students are mixed rather than matched according to
ability. This policy of uniform entry criteria could imply a waste in human potential, as the
variety in student ability within the classroom is too large.
• Regulated tuition fees, deregulated admission policies
This system acknowledges heterogeneity in the population with respect to ability as it allows
universities to differentiate on enrollment criteria. This will induce quality-differentiation across
universities. However, since tuition price cannot be set by the higher education institute,
universities are limited in the amount of money they can collect from tuition payments. This
financial constraint could limit the scope for further quality improvements.
• Deregulated tuition fees and admission policies
This system is the most flexible as it allows schools to set their own tuition fees and to follow
their own admission strategy. Each university will look for a niche in the market with a
particular quality-price combination. The resulting differentiation leads to a better match of
students. So while cross-university differences in quality will increase, each classroom will be
populated by a more homogeneous group of students. Two problems may arise. First, price will
tend to increase in quality. There is thus a potential danger that good but economically
disadvantaged students cannot afford to study at the best schools. On the other hand,
universities could offer need-based student support for instance through a high tuition – high
aid strategy with cross-subsidisation of poor students. Such within-university differentiation in
net tuition price is necessary to preserve academic quality. And in combination with the
provision of a loan-scheme with income-contingent repayment (cf. Chapter 3), higher private
contributions to the cost of higher education do not have to affect accessibility. Second, the
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question whether mixing or matching students increases educational production is unsettled
yet. Economists should talk to education experts and teachers, and learn from their experience.
To conclude, the US system is rather different from the system in the Netherlands. The US
experience seems to show that tuition price differentiation and student selection – as the natural
outcomes of increased competition between higher education institutions – promote both
average quality and price-quality ratios. However, lack of internationally comparable data
hampers a direct translation of the US evidence to other countries. In Chapter 8 we will discuss
the issue of deregulation in the context of the Dutch higher education sector.
